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Despite the importance of proofs in assuring protocol implementers about the security properties of key es-
tablishment protocols, many protocol designers fail to provide any proof of security. Flaws detected long after
the publication and/or implementation of protocols will erode the credibility of key establishment protocols. We
revisit recent work of Choo, Boyd, Hitchcock, & Maitland (2004) where they utilize the Bellare, Pointcheval, &
Rogaway (2000) computational complexity proof model in a machine specification and analysis (using an auto-
mated model checker – SHVT) for provably-secure key establishment protocol analysis. We then examine several
key establishment protocols without proofs of security, namely: protocols due to Jan & Chen (2004), Yang, Shen,
& Shieh (1999), Kim, Huh, Hwang, & Lee (2004), Lin, Sun, & Hwang (2000), and Yeh & Sun (2002). Using these
protcols as case studies, we demonstrate previously unpublished flaws in these protocols. We may speculate that
such errors could have been found by protocol designers if proofs of security were to be constructed, and hope
this work will encourage future protocol designers to provide proofs of security.
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1. Introduction
Despite key establishment protocols being the
sine qua non of many diverse secure electronic
commerce applications, the design of secure key
establishment protocols is still notoriously hard.
The difficulties associated in obtaining a high
level of assurance in the security of almost any
new or even existing protocols are well illustrated
with examples of errors found in many such pro-
tocols years after they were published [4, 18, 19,
27, 31, 32]. The study of cryptographic protocols
has led to a dichotomy in cryptographic protocol
analysis techniques between the computational
complexity approach [7–10,14] and the computer
security approach [26].
Computer Security Approach
Emphasis in the computer security approach is
placed on automated machine specification and
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analysis (e.g., model checking and theorem prov-
ing). The Dolev & Yao [20] adversarial model is
the de-facto model used in formal specifications,
where cryptographic operations are often used in
a “black box” fashion ignoring the various cryp-
tographic properties, resulting in possible loss of
partial information. One of the main obstacles
in this automated approach is the undecidability
and intractability problems since the adversary
can have an exponentially large set of possible
actions (or combinations) which result in a state
explosion [15]. Furthermore, protocols proven se-
cure in such a manner could possibly be flawed
(i.e., giving a false positive result – analogous to
a Type II error in hypothesis testing) [3]. From a
real world practicality perspective, it is debatable
whether proofs of security in this manner carry
significant weight in the real world, due to their
idealistic model. However, the computer security
approach should be credited for proving insecu-
rities in protocols (i.e., finding both known and
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previously unknown flaws in protocols) [6].
Computational Complexity Approach
On the other hand, the computational com-
plexity approach adopts a deductive reasoning
process (i.e., the logical process of deriving a
conclusion from a known premise) whereby the
emphasis is placed on a proven reduction from
the problem of breaking the protocol to another
problem believed to be hard. Since the initiative
of Bellare & Rogaway [9] who provided the first
treatment of computational complexity to cryp-
tographic protocol analysis, more than 100 proto-
cols with accompanying computational proofs of
security have been proposed in the literature [16].
Although these proofs provide a strong assur-
ance for arguing about the security properties of
the protocols, it is often difficult to obtain cor-
rect computational proofs of security. Further-
more, such proofs usually entail lengthy and com-
plicated mathematical proofs, which are daunt-
ing to most reader as suggested by Koblitz &
Menezes [24]. A supporting example is the well-
known example of OAEP mode for public key
encryption [30]. Despite its popularity and in-
clusion in the SET electronic payment standard
of MasterCard and Visa, a problem was found
(and subsequently fixed in the case of RSA) years
later. Difficulties in obtaining correct computa-
tional proofs of protocol security are evidenced
by the breaking of provable-secure protocols af-
ter they were published. Despite these setbacks,
proofs are invaluable tools for arguing about se-
curity and certainly are one very important tool
in getting protocols right.
Unification Approach
Much of the debate and criticism over these two
approaches involves researchers who fail to com-
municate with each other because they hold vary-
ing basic assumptions over cryptographic opera-
tions. However in recent years researchers have
started to recognize the disparity in the vary-
ing assumptions and devote comprehensive efforts
in unifying the two domains [1, 2, 5, 12, 13]. Re-
cent work by Choo et al. [17] advocates a differ-
ent approach to cryptographic protocols analysis
which they term “a complementary approach”.
In their work, they utilize the communication and
adversary model from computational proofs in
a machine specification and analysis, as shown
in Figure 1. They provided a formal specifi-
cation and machine analysis of the adversarial
model from the Bellare, Pointcheval, & Rog-
away (2000) computational complexity model [8],
instead of the traditional Dolev & Yao adver-
sarial model. The pre-proceedings version of
the provably-secure mutual authentication and
key establishment protocol due to Jakobsson &
Pointcheval [21] was analysed and two new previ-
ously unpublished attacks were found using their
approach.
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Figure 1. Choo, Boyd, Hitchcock, & Maitland
(2004) complementary approach [17]
Case Study
In this work, we advocate the importance of
proofs of protocol security and the proposal of
any entity authentication and/or key establish-
ment protocol should provide a rigorous proof
of security (as we argue that protocols without
any computational proofs of security leads one to
question the level of trust in the correctness in
such protocols). We use several protocols which
have no proofs of security as case studies, namely
the two-party mutual authentication and key es-
tablishment protocol due to Jan & Chen [22], two
trusted three-party authenticated key establish-
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ment protocols due to Yang, Shen, & Shieh [33], a
key agreement protocol due to Kim, Huh, Hwang,
& Lee [23], two improved Diffie–Hellman based
encrypted key exchange protocols due to Lin,
Sun, & Hwang [25], and an authenticated key
agreement protocol due to Yeh & Sun [34]. We
then demonstrated previously unknown flaws in
these protocols that can be revealed using the for-
mal specification framework by Choo et al. In
addition, we also reveal that the key agreement
protocol due to Kim, Huh, Hwang, & Lee [23] is
susceptible to an offline dictionary attack, which
cannot be captured in the formal specification
framework.
We use the same formalism as in the formal
specification framework by Choo et al., namely
Asynchronous Product Automata (APA). APA is
a universal state-based formal method [29] and is
supported by the Simple Homomorphism Verifi-
cation Tool (SHVT) [28] for analysis and verifica-
tion of cooperating systems and communicating
automata. Once the possible state transitions of
each automaton have been specified, SHVT can
be used to automatically search the state space of
the model. SHVT provides a reachability graph
of the explored states. In our APA specification,
the abstract communication model captures the
representation of the protocol, the message trans-
mission, and the communication channels.
Organization of Paper
The remainder of this paper is structured as fol-
lows: Section 2 briefly explains the formal speci-
fication framework. Section 3 describes the pro-
tocols that will be used as case studies. Section 4
presents the results of the protocol analysis using
SHVT. Section 5 presents the conclusions.
2. Overview of the Formal Specification
Framework
In this section, an overview of the formal spec-
ification framework using APA specification for
protocol analysis is presented. The framework
adopts the adversary formalism from the Bel-
lare, Pointcheval, & Rogaway (2000) proof model,
hereafter known as the BPR2000 model, where
an adversary A has the capability to read, delay,
replay, modify, delete, and fabricate messages be-
tween communicating principals and to start new
instances of communicating principals. A con-
trols all the communications that take place be-
tween parties by interacting with a set of oracles
at any time in any order. Each of the oracles rep-
resents an instance of a principal (ΠiU denotes the
i-th instance of a principal U) in a specific proto-
col run. The predefined oracle queries are shown
in Table 1.
Send(U1, U2, i, m) query computes a response
according to the protocol specification and
decision on whether to accept or reject yet,
and returns them to the adversary A. If the
client oracle, ΠiU1,U2 , has either accepted with
some session key or terminated, this will be
made known to A.
The client oracle, ΠiU1,U2 , upon receiving a
Reveal(U1, U2, i) query and if it has accepted
and holds some session key, will send this ses-
sion key back to A.
Corrupt(U1, KE) query allows A to corrupt
the principal U1 at will, and thereby learn
the complete internal state of the corrupted
principal. The corrupt query also gives A
the ability to overwrite the long-lived key of
the corrupted principal with any value of her
choice (i.e. KE).
Test(U1, U2, i) query is the only oracle query
that does not correspond to any of A’s abili-
ties. If ΠiU1,U2 has accepted with some session
key and is being asked a Test(U1, U2, i) query,
then depending on a randomly chosen bit b,
A is given either the actual session key or a
session key drawn randomly from the session
key distribution.
Table 1
Informal description of the oracle queries
The definition of (in)security in the framework
depends on the notion of partnership of oracles as
defined in Definition 1 and the notion of freshness
as defined in Definition 2. Partnership is defined
using the notion of session identifiers (SIDs).
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SIDs are defined as the concatenation of mes-
sages exchanged during the particular protocol
run in question. An oracle who has accepted will
hold the associated session key, a SID and a part-
ner identifier (PID).
Definition 1 [BPR2000 Definition of Partner-
ship [8]] Two oracles, ΠiA and Π
j
B, are partners
if, and only if,
1. both oracles have accepted the same session
key with the same SID,
2. both oracles have agreed on the same set of
principals (i.e., the initiator and the respon-
der of the protocol), and
3. no other oracles besides ΠiA and Π
j
B have
accepted with the same SID.
Definition 2 [BPR2000 Definition of Fresh-
ness [8]] Oracle ΠiA is fresh (or it holds a fresh
session key) at the end of execution, if, and only
if,
1. oracle ΠiA has accepted with or without a
partner oracle ΠjB,
2. both oracle ΠiA and its partner oracle Π
j
B (if
such a partner oracle exists) have not been
sent a Reveal query, and
3. both A and B have not been sent a Corrupt
query.
Protocol principals are modelled as a family of
elementary automata and their associated state
spaces are modelled as a family of state sets. The
channel through which the elementary automaton
communicates is modelled by the addition and
removal of messages from the shared state com-
ponent Network, which is initially empty. Each
of the elementary automata only has access to
the particular state components to which it is
connected. In addition to the regular proto-
col principals, a malicious adversary A is speci-
fied. A has access to the shared state component
Network, but no access to the internal states of
the principals. A is able to intercept messages
in the Network, swap data components in the in-
tercepted messages to form new messages, remove
messages from the Network, or fabricate new mes-
sages. A is then able to send these messages to
any player (i.e., client or server) oracles via the
Network. The abilities of A to send any mes-
sages at will to any player oracles corresponds
to the SendClient and SendServer queries in the
BPR2000 model. The graphical illustration of
Jan–Chen MAKEP in APA specification is shown
in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. An example graphical illustration of
Jan–Chen MAKEP in APA specification
Once a player oracle has accepted and holds a
session key, the (SID ,PID) pair associated with
that oracle becomes visible to the adversaryA via
the shared state component Transcript. If A so
chooses, A is then able to obtain the session key
of ΠiU via a Reveal query or a Corrupt query. The
shared state component Transcript also contains
a log of all sent messages and is equivalent to a
transcript in the Bellare-Rogaway model.
Definition 3 presents the definition of insecu-
rity in the formal specification framework. Defi-
nition 3 depends on the notions of partnership in
Definition 1 and freshness in Definition 2.
Definition 3 A protocol is insecure in the formal
specification framework if:
1. two fresh non-partner oracles accept the
same key (i.e., violating key establishment
goal), or
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2. two fresh partner oracles accept two differ-
ent keys (i.e., violating key establishment
goal), or
3. some fresh oracle accepts some key, which
has been exposed and known to A (i.e., vi-
olating key establishment goal), or
4. some fresh oracle accepts and terminates
with no partner (i.e., violating entity au-
thentication goal).
Protocols proven insecure in this framework
will also be insecure in the BPR2000 model
and very likely in other variants of the Bellare–
Rogaway model [9–11] and the modular proof
model due to Canetti & Krawczyk [14].
3. Case Study
In this section, the previously unbroken Jan–
Chen two-party mutual authentication and key
establishment protocol [22], two Yang–Shen–
Shieh trusted three-party authenticated key es-
tablishment protocols [33], Kim–Huh–Hwang–
Lee key agreement protocol [23], Lin–Sun–Hwang
improved Diffie–Hellman based encrypted key ex-
change protocols MDHEKE I and II [25], and
the Yeh–Sun authenticated key agreement pro-
tocol [34] are revisited.
In a real world setting, it is normal to assume
that a host can establish several concurrent ses-
sions with many different parties. Sessions are
specific to both the communicating parties. In
the case of key distribution protocols, sessions are
specific to both the initiator and the responder
principals, where every session is associated with
a unique session key. SIDs enable unique identi-
fication of the individual sessions. Without such
means, communicating hosts will have difficulty
determining the associated session key for a par-
ticular session. Hence, in this paper, we define
partnership using SIDs as explained in Section 2.
The notations used in the remaining of this paper
is presented in Table 2.
3.1. Jan–Chen Mutual Authentication and
Key Establishment Protocol
Figure 3 describes the Jan–Chen mutual
authentication and key establishment protocol
{·}KU denotes the encryption of some
message under encryption key KU
PwdAB denotes some secret password share
between some entities, A and B
H(·) denotes the hash of some message
SKAB denotes the secret session key that
is known to only the particular in-
stances of some entities, A and B
SIDU denotes the session identifier (SID)
of some entity, U
PIDU denotes the partner identifier
(PID) of some entity, U
f denotes some simple derivation
function
Table 2
Summary of notations
(MAKEP) [22]. There are two entities in the pro-
tocol, namely a client of limited computing power,
A and a server, B. The security goals of the pro-
tocols are mutual authentication and key estab-
lishment. In the protocol, the notation x ∈R Z
∗
n
denotes that x is randomly drawn from Z∗n. At
the end of the protocol run, both A and B will
share a secret session key SKAB known to only
the particular instances of A and B.
3.2. Yang–Shen–Shieh Trusted Three-
Party Authenticated Key Establish-
ment Protocols
Two trusted three-party authenticated key es-
tablishment protocols (with and without public
key systems) due to Yang–Shen–Shieh [33] are
shown in Figures 4 and 5. There are three entities
in the protocols, namely a trusted server S, an ini-
tiating client A, and a responder client B. The se-
curity goals of these two protocols are mutual au-
thentication and key establishment. The notation
used in the protocols is as follows, NU , RU de-
notes some randomly chosen nonces, KS denotes
the public key of S, and KU,S = (g
Xu,Yu mod β)
denotes the key for long term use between U and
S, where g and β are two large primes.
At the end of both protocol runs, A and B will
share a secret session key KAB known to only
the particular instances of A and B. The session
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Registration Phase
Client A Server B
x ∈R Z
∗
n
v = g−xmod N
v
−−−−−−−−−→ y = (v − IDA)
dmod N
public/private key pair (y, x)
y
←−−−−−−−−−
public/private key pair (e, d)
Session Key Generation
rs ∈R Zn
IDA, y
−−−−−−−−−→
w ∈R Zn
rs←−−−−−−−−−
u = gw mod N
k ∈R Zn
ι = {k}e, s = w + x · H(rs||ι||u)
u, ι, s
−−−−−−−−−→
gs · vH(rs||ι||u))
?
= u mod N
H(k)
?
= H(k)′
H(k)
←−−−−−−−−−
σ = k ⊕ s
SKAB = σ = k ⊕ s mod N = SKBA
Figure 3. Jan–Chen MAKEP
1. A −→ B : {A, NA, KAS}KS , RA
2. B −→ S : {A, NA, KAS}KS ,
{B, NB , KBS}KS
3. S −→ B : {A, B, KAB}NA , {B, A, K}NB
4. B −→ A : {A, B, KAB}NA , {RA, RB}KAB
5. A −→ B : {RB}KAB
Figure 4. Yang–Shen–Shieh trusted 3-Party AKE
with public key systems protocol 1
identifiers (SIDs) for both A and B in protocol 1
are SIDA = SIDB = {RA, RB}, and in protocol
2 are SIDA = SIDB = {NA, NB}.
1. A −→ B : A, {gXa mod β}KAS , NA
2. B −→ S : A, B, {gXa mod β}KAS ,
{gXb mod β}KBS
3. S −→ B : {gYa mod β}KAS ,
{A, B, KAB}KA,S ,
{gYb mod β}KBS ,
{B, A, KAB}KB,S
4. B −→ A : {A, B, KAB}KA,S ,
{NA, NB}KAB
5. A −→ B : {NB}KAB
Figure 5. Yang–Shen–Shieh trusted 3-Party AKE
without public key systems protocol 2
3.3. Kim–Huh–Hwang–Lee Key Agree-
ment Protocol
Figure 6 describes the Kim–Huh–Hwang–Lee
key agreement protocol [23]. Both the initiator A
and responder B has a shared password, PwdAB .
Prior to running the protocol, A and B compute
Q and Q−1 from PwdAB respectively. At the end
of the protocol run, both A and B will share a
secret session key SKAB and SKBA respectively,
where SKAB = g
ab mod n = SKBA.
We observe that this protocol is susceptible to
an offline dictionary attack, as explained below.
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A (Q, PwdAB) B (Q
−1, PwdAB)
a ∈R {0, 1}
k, b ∈R {0, 1}
k
X1 = g
aQ mod n
X1−−−−−−−−−→ Y1 = g
bQ−1 mod n
X
?
= ga mod n
Y1, X
←−−−−−−−−− X = (X1)
Q−1 mod n
Y = (Y1)
Q mod n Y−−−−−−−−−→ Y
?
= gb mod n
SKAB = Y
a = gab mod n SKBA = X
b = gab mod n
Figure 6. Kim–Huh–Hwang–Lee key agreement protocol
1. By observing the protocol execution shown
in Figure 6, a passive adversary, A, knows
the value of X1 = g
aQ mod n and X =
(X1)
Q−1 mod n, where both Q and Q−1 are
computed from PwdAB .
2. From the password space of PwdAB , A se-
lects a password αA at random.
(a) A computes Q−1A from αA.
(b) A computes X ′ = X
Q
−1
A
1 mod n.
(c) A compares if X
?
= X ′.
(d) If X = X ′, then A terminates as
PwdAB = αA, else exclude αA from
the password space, and repeat Step
2.
Offline dictionary attack presents a more sub-
tle threat as the adversary, A, can impersonate
a legitimate party to initiate transactions. Our
analysis model does not capture dictionary at-
tacks. However, we will show in the next Section
on the attacks that are revealed by our analysis
model.
3.4. Lin–Sun–Hwang Key Improved Pro-
tocols MDHEKE I and II
Figures 7 and 8 describe the Lin–Sun–Hwang
improved protocols MDHEKE I and II [25]. Both
the initiator A and the responder B share a secret
password PwdAB .
At the end of both protocol runs shown in Fig-
ures 7 and 8, both A and B accept with the same
session key SKAB = g
ab mod n = SKBA.
3.5. Yeh–Sun Key Authenticated Key
Agreement Protocol
Figure 9 describes the Yeh–Sun key authenti-
cated key agreement protocol [34]. A and B share
a secret password PwdAB . At the end of the pro-
tocol run shown in Figure 9, A and B accept ses-
sion keys SKAB = H(K1) = H(K2) = SKBA.
4. Protocol Analysis
In this section, the protocols discussed in Sec-
tion 3 are specified using APA and the automated
state space analyses performed with SHVT reveal
that the protocols violate the respective require-
ment(s) of Definition 3, as shown in Table 10.
4.1. Protocol Analysis 1: Jan–Chen
MAKEP
Figure 11 describes an execution of the protocol
in the presence of a malicious adversary, A.
At the end of the protocol execution shown in
Figure 11, A accepts session key SKAB = σAB =
k⊕ s mod N and B accepts session key SKBA =
k ⊕ sA mod N , where SKAB 6= SKBA. In fact,
B thinks that the key SKBA is being shared with
the adversary, A.
State space analysis performed in the SHVT
analysis reveals that both requirements 2 and 4
of Definition 3 are violated. As shown in the at-
tack sequence in Figure 12, the adversaryA sends
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A (PwdAB) B (PwdAB)
x ∈R {0, 1}
k, RA = g
x mod n
A, {RA}PwdAB−−−−−−−−−→ y, CB ∈R {0, 1}
k
SKAB = H((RB)
x mod n)
RB , {f(RB), CB}SKBA←−−−−−−−−− RB = g
y mod n
Decrypt {f(RB), CB}SKBA
Verify f(RB)
CB−−−−−−−−−→ SKBA = H((RA)
y mod n)
Figure 7. Lin–Sun–Hwang Key improved protocol MDHEKE I
A (pwd) B (pwd)
x ∈R {0, 1}
k, RA = g
x mod n
A, {RA}PwdAB−−−−−−−−−→ y, CB ∈R {0, 1}
k
SKAB = H((RB)
x mod n)
RB ,H(RB , SKBA)
←−−−−−−−−− RB = g
y mod n
Verify H(RB , SKBA)
H(SKAB)
−−−−−−−−−→ SKBA = H((RA)
y mod n)
Figure 8. Lin–Sun–Hwang Key improved protocol MDHEKE II
Figure Requirement(s)
No. Violated
Associated Security
Goals Violated
3 1, 2, & 4 Key establishment &
Entity authentication
4 3 & 4 Key establishment &
Entity authentication
5 3 & 4 Key establishment &
Entity authentication
6 1 Key establishment
7 1 Key establishment
8 1 Key establishment
9 1 Key establishment
Figure 10. Violations of Definition 3 in protocol
analyses
a Reveal query to a non-partner oracle of A, B
as B believes SKBA is being shared with A. A
by asking for the session key of B (i.e., SKBA)
will be able to compute the session key SKAB
accepted by A (SKAB = SKBA ⊕ sA). A practi-
cal consequence of this attack is that A is able to
impersonate A to B to initiate transactions.
Hence, the Jan–Chen MAKEP shown in Fig-
ure 3 is not secure since both the key establish-
ment and mutual authentication goals are vio-
lated, as demonstrated in the attack sequences
shown in Figures 11 and 12.
4.2. Protocol Analysis 2: Yang-Shen-Shieh
Trusted 3-Party AKE with Public Key
Systems
Figure 13 describes an execution of Yang–
Shen–Shieh trusted 3-Party AKE with public key
systems in the presence of a malicious adversary,
A. Let AU denote A impersonating user U .
At the end of the attack sequence shown in
Figure 13, neither A nor B are partnered since
they do not have matching SIDs (i.e., SIDA =
{gRA , gRE} and SIDB = {g
RE , gRB}) and A has
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A (pwd) B (pwd)
x ∈p Zp∗, X = g
x mod p
X ⊕ PwdAB−−−−−−−−−→ X = X ⊕ pwd⊕ pwd
Y = Y ⊕ PwdAB ⊕ pwd
Y ⊕ PwdAB ||H(K2, X)
←−−−−−−−−− y ∈p Zp∗, Y = g
y mod n
K1 = Y
x = gxy mod p K2 = X
y mod p = gxy mod p
H(K1, X)
?
= H(K2, X)
H(K1, Y )
−−−−−−−−−→ H(K1, Y )
?
= H(K2, Y )
Figure 9. Yeh–Sun authenticated key agreement protocol
not accepted a key, thus violating requirement 4
of Definition 3. Also, both A and B have differ-
ent SIDs, hence according to Definition 1, A and
B cannot be partners. Although B has accepted
the key KR2 , B believes that KR2 is being shared
with A when in fact, KR2 is being shared with the
adversary A (i.e., unknown key share attack), in
violation of requirement 3 of Definition 3. A prac-
tical consequence of this attack is that A is able
to impersonate A to B to initiate transactions.
4.3. Protocol Analysis 3: Yang-Shen-Shieh
Trusted 3-Party AKE without Public
Key Systems
Figure 14 describes an execution of Yang–
Shen–Shieh trusted 3-Party AKE without public
key systems in the presence of a malicious adver-
sary, A.
At the end of the attack sequence shown in
Figure 14, neither A nor B are partnered since
they do not have matching SIDs (i.e., SIDA =
{gRA , gRE} and SIDB = {g
RE , gRB}) and A has
not accepted a key, thus violating requirement 4
of Definition 3. Also, both A and B have dif-
ferent SIDs, hence according to Definition 1, A
and B cannot be partners. Although B has ac-
cepted the key KR2, B believes that KR2 is being
shared with A when in fact, KR2 is being shared
with the adversary A (i.e., unknown key share
attack). Hence, requirement 3 of Definition 3 is
violated.
4.4. Protocol Analysis 4: Kim–Huh–
Hwang–Lee Key Agreement Protocol
Figure 15 describes the attack sequence on the
Kim–Huh–Hwang–Lee key agreement protocol.
At the end of the attack sequence, A has ac-
cepted session key SKAB = g
ab mod n whilst
B has accepted session key SKBA = g
abE mod n,
where SKAB 6= SKBA. However, both A and B
are not partners since they have accepted differ-
ent session keys with different SIDs (i.e., sidA =
{X1, Y1, X, Y } 6= sidB = {X
E
1 , Y1, X
E , Y }). By
revealing B, the adversary A is able to obtain
the session key SKBA = g
abE and is able to com-
pute the session key of A by computing SKE
−1
BA =
gab = SKAB. Hence, the Kim–Huh–Hwang–Lee
key agreement protocol shown in Figure 6 is in-
secure.
4.5. Protocol Analysis 5: Lin–Sun–Hwang
Improved Protocol MDHEKE I
Figure 16 describes the attack sequence (i.e.,
reflection attack) on the Lin–Sun–Hwang im-
proved protocol MDHEKE I. Let AU denote A
impersonating some user U . At the end of the
attack sequence, A thinks that she has completed
two concurrent sessions with B and has accepted
session keys SKS1AB = H(g
xx2) = SKS2AB. How-
ever, B has no knowledge of these two sessions
and this implies that A has no partner. By re-
vealing session 2 at A to obtain SKS2AB, the ad-
versary A is then able to obtain a fresh session
key SKS1AB .
Hence, the Lin–Sun–Hwang improved protocol
MDHEKE I shown in Figure 7 is insecure since
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A (y, x) A (yA, xA) B (e, d)
IDA, y
−−−−−−−−−→
IDA, y
−−−−−−−−−→ rsA ∈R Zn
IDA, yA
−−−−−−−−−→ rsA ∈R Zn
Intercept
rs←−−−−−−−−−
w ∈R Zn
rsA←−−−−−−−−− wA ∈R Zn
rsA←−−−−−−−−−
u = gw mod N uA = g
wA mod N
k ∈R Zn kA ∈R Zn
ι = {k}e ιA = {kA}e
s = w + x · H(rsA||ι|u)
u, ι, s
−−−−−−−−−→ Intercept
sA = wA + xA · H(rsA||ι||uA)
uA, ι, sA
−−−−−−−−−→
gsA·v
H(rsA||ι||uA)) ?= uA mod N
H(k)
?
= H(k)′
H(k)
←−−−−−−−−−
H(k)
←−−−−−−−−− σBA = k ⊕ sA
Figure 11. Attack sequence on mutual authentication goal of Jan–Chen MAKEP
the adversary A is able to obtain the session key
of a fresh oracle of a non-partner oracle by re-
vealing a non-partner oracle holding the same key
(i.e., violating the key establishment goal).
4.6. Protocol Analysis 6: Lin–Sun–Hwang
Improved Protocol MDHEKE II
Figure 17 describes a similar reflection attack
on the Lin–Sun–Hwang improved protocol MD-
HEKE II.
At the end of the protocol execution shown in
Figure 17, A thinks that she has completed two
concurrent sessions with B and has accepted ses-
sion keys SKS1AB = H(g
xx2) = SKS2AB. However,
B has no knowledge of these two sessions and this
implies that A has no partner. By revealing ses-
sion 2 at A to obtain SKS2AB, the adversary A is
then able to obtain a fresh session key SKS1AB.
Hence, the Lin–Sun–Hwang improved protocol
MDHEKE II shown in Figure 8 is insecure since
the adversary A is able to obtain the session key
of a fresh oracle of a non-partner oracle by re-
vealing a non-partner oracle holding the same key
(i.e., violating the key establishment goal).
4.7. Protocol Analysis 7: Yeh–Sun Au-
thenticated Key Agreement Protocol
Figure 18 describes the attack sequence (i.e.,
reflection attack) on the Yeh–Sun authenticated
key agreement protocol. At the end of the proto-
col execution shown in Figure 18, A thinks that
she has completed two concurrent sessions with B
and has accepted session keys SKS1AB = H(K2) =
SKS2AB . However, B has no knowledge of these
two sessions and this implies that A has no part-
ner. By revealing session 2 at A to obtain SKS2AB,
the adversary A is then able to obtain a fresh
session key SKS1AB.
Hence, the Yeh–Sun Key authenticated key
agreement protocol shown in Figure 9 since the
adversary A is able to obtain the session key of
a fresh oracle of a non-partner oracle by reveal-
ing a non-partner oracle holding the same key, in
violation of the key establishment goal.
5. Conclusion
Through a detailed study of the two-party mu-
tual authentication and key establishment proto-
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Continue from the unknown key share attack in Figure 11
A (yA, xA) B (e, d)
Reveal
−−−−−−−−−→
SKBA←−−−−−−−−−
SKA = KBA ⊕ sA ⊕ s = SKAB
Figure 12. Attack sequence on key establishment goal of Jan–Chen MAKEP
1(R1). A −→ B : {A, NA, KA}KS , RA
2(R1). B −→ S : {A, NA, KA}KS , {B, NB, KB}KS
A starts another protocol run - Protocol Run 2 (R2)
1(R2). AB −→ A : {B, NB, KB}KS , RA
2(R2). A −→ S : {B, NB, KB}KS , {A, NA(R2), KA}KS
3(R1). S −→ B : {A, B, KR1}NA , {B, A, KR1}NB
A intercepts message in protocol flow 3 (R1)
3(R2). S −→ A : {B, A, KR2}NB , {A, B, KR2}NA(R2)
A reveals A to obtain KR2 and uses A as a decryption oracle.
3(R1). AS −→ B : {A, B, KR1}NA , {B, A, KR2}NB
4(R1). B −→ A : {A, B, KR1}NA , {RA, RB}KR2
5(R1). AA −→ B : {RB}KR2
Figure 13. Attack sequence on Yang–Shen–Shieh trusted 3-Party AKE with public key systems
col due to Jan & Chen [22], two trusted three-
party authenticated key establishment protocols
due to Yang, Shen, & Shieh [33], a key agree-
ment protocol due to Kim, Huh, Hwang, &
Lee [23], two improved Diffie–Hellman based en-
crypted key exchange protocols due to Lin, Sun,
& Hwang [25], and an authenticated key agree-
ment protocol due to Yeh & Sun [34], we demon-
strated previously unpublished flaws in these pro-
tocols which do not have accompanying proofs of
security.
Proofs are invaluable for arguing about secu-
rity and certainly are one very important tool
in getting protocols right. Without proofs of se-
curity, protocol implementers cannot be assured
about the security properties of protocols. Flaws
in protocols discovered after they were published
or implemented certainly will have a damaging
effect on the trustworthiness and the credibility
of key establishment protocols in the real world.
As a result of this work, we would recommend
that protocol designers provide proofs of security
for their protocols, in order to assure protocol im-
plementers about the security properties of pro-
tocols.
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